The Dive, 7/1/25
Your monthly compilation of what's what on global politics, American society, and an assortment of odds and ends
Quote of the Month
"Why should there not be a patient confidence in the ultimate justice of the people? Is there any better or equal hope, in the world? In our present differences, is either party without faith of being in the right? If the Almighty Ruler of nations, with his eternal truth and justice, be on your side of the North, or on yours of the South, that truth, and that justice, will surely prevail, by the judgment of this great tribunal of the American people... While the people retain their virtue and vigilance, no administration, by any extreme of wickedness or folly, can very seriously injure the government in the short space of four years." - Abraham Lincoln, First Inaugural Address, March 4, 1861
What I’m Reading:
1. How NATO’s Nordic and Baltic members have taken leadership over the alliance
Why you should read it: Retired Army general Mark Hertling details in The Bulwark the way eight NATO Nordic and Baltic members have taken a leadership role in the alliance since the accession of Finland and Sweden in 2023 and 2024.
“When Sweden and Finland joined NATO in 2023 and 2024, respectively, their accession wasn’t just a procedural addition of new members. It changed the strategic orientation of the whole alliance. Their inclusion accelerated the formation of the Nordic-Baltic Eight (NB8)—Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Iceland, Latvia, Lithuania, Norway, and Sweden—as NATO’s most cohesive and operationally capable regional bloc, a development that became unmistakable at the NATO summit concluded this week in the Hague… The Nordic-Baltic Eight have long shared geography, values, and an acute understanding of Russian behavior. With Sweden and Finland now under NATO’s formal umbrella, this regional grouping has emerged not as a quiet coalition, but as a leadership caucus—shaping policy, driving modernization, and reinforcing transatlantic resolve in ways far that go beyond what their population sizes or economies alone would indicate.”
“None of this is occurring in a vacuum. These countries are responding to a very real and proximate threat. Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 was not a regional anomaly—it was a wake-up call. For the Nordic-Baltic Eight, it clarified something that should have been obvious to the rest of Europe: Hard power, political will, and alliance credibility still matter… But perhaps the most important shift isn’t tactical. It’s cultural. These nations are not just defenders of territory. They are advocates for the alliance’s values—resilience, transparency, and democratic civil-military relations. Their defense ministries are emphasizing public education, infrastructure hardening, and hybrid threat response. Their officers serve in NATO command structures and participate in complex joint exercises like BALTOPS and Arctic Challenge.”
Why it matters: “Perhaps most importantly, what the NB8 bring to the alliance isn’t just military professionalism but populations that understand the threat posed by Putin’s Russia and are willing to do what it takes to deter or defeat it. In Finland, trust in the military is near 90 percent—which is remarkably high considering almost everyone serves. In Sweden, nearly the entire political spectrum supports the decision to abandon centuries of neutrality and join NATO. All eight nations are on track to meet or exceed the 2 percent GDP defense spending target, but more importantly, they are using those funds smartly—on personnel, logistics, modernization, and resilience. They’re not just checking boxes. They’re preparing for the future… The Nordic-Baltic Eight are doing just that. They’ve demonstrated that strong values, serious planning, and regional trust-building are not only compatible with NATO’s mission—they are essential to it. Sweden and Finland didn’t just join NATO. Along with their neighbors, they are helping it evolve—toward greater agility, credibility, and purpose.”
2. Why Europe doesn’t have a “China card” to play
Why you should read it: In Foreign Affairs, Council on Foreign Relations experts Heidi Creibo-Rediker and Liana Fix outline the ways a European attempt at detente with Beijing would hurt European interests.
“The first hundred days of Donald Trump’s second presidency have turned out worse for Europeans than expected. In addition to Vice President JD Vance’s ideological crusade against European liberals, there are fears that the United States will abandon Ukraine and frustration and concern over Trump’s initiation of unprecedented tariffs on European countries. In the wake of these disruptions, it is not surprising that the gaze of some European politicians has wistfully turned toward China, which is perceived by some as a potential hedge against an unpredictable United States… But the harsh reality is that the game has not really changed: the EU still doesn’t have a China card to play. In fact, Trump’s disruptions are only magnifying China’s economic and security threats to Europe. To offset U.S. tariffs this year, China diverted its exports to alternative markets including Europe. This resulted in a record Chinese trade surplus with Europe in the first quarter of 2025. These low-cost Chinese exports are massively subsidized and undercut European producers who are already facing margin pressures and the imposition of U.S. tariffs. Many of the goods China redirected from the United States to the EU are now competing directly with Europe’s core manufacturing industries—the automotive sector, for instance, as well as electronics, industrial machinery and components, home appliances, and clean energy technologies. This flood of goods could damage the broader competitiveness of Europe’s manufacturing ecosystem, creating something like the ‘China shock’ that rocked the United States in the first decade of this century.”
“Insulating itself from trade shocks, however, is only step one: Europe must also stop underestimating China’s support for Russia’s war against Ukraine, which in turn threatens European security. During the Biden administration, the United States condemned China’s support of the Russian industrial base, but Europe has been more cautious and has rarely threatened Beijing or followed through with serious consequences. Beijing has stopped short of delivering weapons directly to Russia, which President Joe Biden warned is a redline. But China’s supply of dual-use goods, such as semiconductor chips and weapons parts, has taken on such proportions that it has become the equivalent of providing lethal aid: Carnegie estimates that, in 2023, China was responsible for roughly 90 percent of the goods that Russia needs to sustain its war effort. An internal EU report this year estimates that China is responsible for approximately 80 percent of all circumventions of sanctions against Russia… Even if the United States is not on board with such sanctions, Europe has a lot of leverage of its own. The flip side of Europe’s trade dependence on China is China’s own reliance on Europe’s market to absorb its excess capacity. Since Trump’s tariff announcements against China and the diversion of U.S.-bound Chinese goods to Europe, Europe is now an even more important market for China’s exports; Europeans should use that leverage to ramp up the pressure on China. Instead of merely sanctioning Chinese companies that trade in goods that are of use to Russia’s military, the European Union should apply sanctions on Chinese banks that help Russia circumvent the EU’s sanctions regime. And if China truly wants to pursue a revival of an investment agreement with Europe, Brussels should condition any talks on China restricting the flow of dual-use goods to Russia’s military.”
Why it matters: “Increased pressure on China will not, of course, result in Beijing abandoning Moscow. Nor will more free-trade agreements completely make up for the economic losses in a trade war with the United States and diminishing returns from trade with China. But regardless of how hostile the Trump administration (and Trump himself) is to the EU and how sweet the gestures are from Beijing, Europe must remember that China is not its friend. Europe cannot hedge against Trump’s disruptions by selling out its own economy and security.”
3. Why bombs can’t change Iran’s regime
Why you should read it: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace senior fellow Karim Sadjadpour writes in the New York Times that Israeli and American airstrikes won’t bring about the regime change Iran desperately needs to reclaim its place in the world.
“Long before Israel’s invasion and Mr. Trump’s strikes, the Islamic republic resembled a zombie regime, ideologically dead but still repressive, much like the late-stage Soviet Union. Despite the country’s vast human capital and resources, Tehran’s theocrats preside over an economically isolated, socially repressive police state — elbow-deep in corruption and repression, yet ruling from the moral pedestal of an Islamist theocracy. The regime’s enduring slogans, ‘Death to America’ and ‘Death to Israel’ — never ‘long live Iran’ — have long made clear that its priority has always been opposing others, not uplifting its own people… Today, the regime most likely has the support of less than 20 percent of society, but up until now it has maintained a highly armed, organized repressive apparatus willing to kill en masse. By contrast, the regime’s far more numerous opponents are unarmed, unorganized and unwilling to die en masse. The state venerates martyrdom; the larger society aspires to separate mosque and state. This disparity has enabled the regime to brutally quash nationwide uprisings, including the Woman, Life, Freedom protests of 2022 and 2023.”
“History shows that military entanglements can either entrench or unravel authoritarian regimes… If there’s a pattern, it’s this: Wars tend to strengthen revolutionary regimes in their early years, but military humiliations expose the brittleness of aging ones. Populations are more likely to rally behind existential wars than elective ones. Since its inception, the Islamic republic has waged a war of choice against Israel — not one of necessity… Revolutionary movements become viable when they attract a critical mass of people, but a critical mass of people will not join them until they believe it is viable. While a critical mass of Iranians today may believe the Islamic republic does not have a future, no opposition figure or movement has succeeded in channeling Iranians’ mass discontent toward a political alternative… Despite most Iranians’ desires to live under a tolerant, representative government that works for their prosperity, authoritarian transitions tend to be brutality contests, not popularity contests, often won by those with the greatest coercive powers. In Iran, it is military men, aspiring Iranian Putins and Sisis and not civilian reformers, who are the best positioned to seize control. According to one study, since World War II fewer than a quarter of authoritarian collapses have led to democracy — and those brought about by foreign intervention or violence have been even less likely to do so”
Why it matters: “…But the most consequential battle for Iran’s future will be fought not between Iran and the outside world, but among Iranians themselves. That struggle is only beginning. Iran’s dynamic, modern population shows there is a light at the end of the tunnel. While outside forces may attempt to blast open the entrance, only Iranian leadership, unity and sacrifice can pave the way through it.”
4. Why ideology best explains Trump’s foreign policy
Why you should read it: Classics scholar Bret Devereaux argues in Foreign Policy that Trump’s foreign policy is the result of his administration’s ideological commitments more than anything else.
“What may seem like a nonsensical constellation of foreign-policy positions presents a coherent list of desired friends and hated enemies when viewed through the lens of the ideological worldview that animates key decision-makers in the executive branch… So how does ideology look as a model for understanding the Trump administration? This requires first sketching the administration’s ideological worldview, with the necessary caveat that individual members likely differ in their attachment to any given component, and then testing that worldview against the foreign-policy agenda that we’ve seen thus far… Let’s look at its policy in Europe. While realists have attempted to frame U.S. efforts to back out of supporting Ukraine through a realist-restrainer lens, such an approach struggles to explain the whole of the administration’s strategy in the continent, like the unveiled contempt for allies or imposing tariffs on friendly European countries but not hostile states like Russia or Belarus.”
“U.S. President Donald Trump’s tariffs are another area of sharp deviation from traditional Republican orthodoxy, which… realist assessments struggle to explain. However, the pursuit of economic autarky has been a core ideological goal for a range of personalist, authoritarian regimes on both the right and left. The pursuit of autarky as a means of excluding the influence of international economic systems imagined to be Jewish-controlled was a core ideological mission of the Third Reich, despite being bad economics, motivating much of Hitler’s aggression—including his disastrous invasion of the Soviet Union… Such efforts may serve a domestic purpose, and even though more autarkic economies are poorer and less productive, they are more under the control of their authoritarian leaders. At the same time, such policies arose out of ideological imperatives to include corrupting foreign influences, whether out of anti-capitalist or antisemitic ideology. Trump’s pursuit of tariffs seems equally ideological: ‘He just likes tariffs,’ he thinks ‘trade is bad,’ and he has surrounded himself with advisors who think the same.”
Why it matters: “In short, many of the Trump administration’s otherwise inexplicable foreign-policy decisions are, in fact, perfectly explicable in the context of a foreign policy driven by a MAGA ideology that is personalist, authoritarian, anti-globalist, and white nationalist. Recognizing this is important, because an ideologically driven government may act in ways that, while not consistent with realist analysis, stated domestic policy objectives, or party traditions, are still predictable… Attempting to understand the Trump administration’s decisions purely through the lens of realpolitik, domestic policies, Republican party traditions, or power-politics infighting is bound to render quite a few decisions as confusing. But an analysis that key administration actors are, quite bluntly, racists and fascists will find that the Trump 2.0 foreign policy makes a distressing amount of sense.”
5. Why FPV drones kinda suck
Why you should read it: For War on the Rocks, former Armed Forces of Ukraine foreign volunteer Jakub Jajcay pushes back against claims that first-person video-controlled drones represent the future of warfare.
“In 2024 and 2025, I served for six months as an international volunteer on a first-person view attack drone team in the Armed Forces of Ukraine. My team was deployed in the Donbas region, in one of the hottest sectors of the front. When I joined the team, I was excited to work with a cutting-edge tool. By the end of my deployment, I was a bit disillusioned. Let me tell you why… During my time in Ukraine, I collected statistics on the success of our drone operations. I found that 43 percent of our sorties resulted in a hit on the intended target in the sense that the drone was able to successfully fly all the way to the target, identify it correctly, hit it, and the drone’s explosive charge detonated as it was supposed to. This number does not include instances when our higher command requested a sortie but we had to decline because we knew that we could not strike the target for reasons such as weather, technical problems, or electronic interference. If this type of pre-aborted mission is included in the total, the success rate drops to between 20 and 30 percent. On the face of it, this success rate is bad, but that is not the whole story.”
“I began to notice that the vast majority of our sorties were against targets that had already been struck successfully by a different weapons system, most commonly by a mortar or by a munition dropped by a reusable drone (in other words, not a first-person view drone). Put differently, the goal of the majority of our missions was to deliver the second tap in a double-tap strike against a target that had already been successfully prosecuted by a different weapons system… There are two reasons why these drones rarely successfully do what they were designed to do. The first has to do with how commanders choose to employ first-person view drones. Presumably, our commanders decided that they had first-person view drones as a capability, so they might as well use them, even if there were other weapons systems that could also do the job. There is a certain logic to this, and the commanders were not paying for the expended drones out of their own pockets. They were more focused on the immediate mission. While first-person view drones are cheap, they are usually not the cheapest option available to commanders… The second reason why these drones rarely do what they were designed to do is technical. They are finicky, unreliable, hard to use, and susceptible to electronic interference. Few first-person view drones have night-vision capability. Those that do are in short supply and cost twice as much as the base model. In Ukraine, in the winter, it’s dark for 14 hours a day. Wind, rain, snow, and fog all mean a drone cannot fly… But the greatest obstacle to the successful use of these drones by far is the unreliability of the radio link between the operator and the drone. One of the reasons why hitting a target at ground level with precision is difficult is that when first-person view drones get close to the ground, due to obstacles, they start to lose their radio connection to the operator, often located up to 10 kilometers away. In some cases, drones cannot attack a target if it is simply on the wrong side of a tall building or hill because the building or hill blocks the line of sight between the drone and the operator. Sometimes, the operator can work around the loss of signal close to the ground by climbing, pointing the drone at the target, and hoping inertia will take it to its target once they have lost control. When striking a small target like a doorway, a window, or the entrance to a basement, this degrades precision significantly.”
Why it matters: “All that said, if a member of a NATO military were hypothetically to ask me whether NATO countries should acquire first-person view drone capabilities, based on my experience and given the current state of the technology, I would probably say no, whether they are radio-controlled or fiber-optic. The vast majority of first-person view drone missions can be completed more cheaply, effectively, or reliably by other assets. Furthermore, other authors have noted that drones still do not come close to matching the effects that can be achieved by massed artillery fires. Additionally, experts on artillery systems consistently note the greater reliability and range of artillery…. For sophisticated NATO militaries, instead of investing heavily in the development of first-person view drone capabilities, I would, first of all, recommend ensuring that troops in the field have well-trained organic mortar support with an ample supply of ammunition. Mortars, like artillery, can’t be stopped by bad weather, jamming, or crowded frequencies. Nor can they be impeded by the dark. A well-trained mortar crew can reliably put rounds on a target in less than five minutes… In practice, I don’t remember a single case when we struck a target that was beyond the range of mortars, and we certainly never struck a target that was beyond the range of artillery.”
6. Why nonviolence remains the best way to take on Trump
Why you should read it: In the New York Times, political scientist Omar Wasow and sociologist Robb Willer make the case that nonviolent resistance represents the best form of opposition to Trump.
“History and research make clear that violence seen as unnecessary, whether from the state or protesters, typically reduces popular support for the political players who use it. The public’s rejection of violence they view as unjustified is consistent — so much so that it often elicits complex strategic games, with movements and the state maneuvering to portray the other as unnecessarily violent. Still, important exceptions exist, and understanding when and why nonviolence wins hearts and minds requires understanding the vast research on the topic… Rather than quell dissent, repression can mobilize opposition and erode the government’s legitimacy. Other scholarship suggests that when state officials use excessive force against peaceful protesters — such as when the police commissioner Bull Connor in 1963 blasted civil rights activists with fire hoses in Birmingham, Ala. — the images generated can be particularly effective for movements… These findings suggest that the more force the state uses on peaceful demonstrators, the more the state may inadvertently fuel precisely the kind of mass opposition it seeks to suppress.”
“A range of research, including our own, shows that violent tactics used by protesters often backfire, too. Looking at thousands of events in the 1960s, one of us (Dr. Wasow) found that counties exposed to Black-led nonviolent protests shifted toward the Democratic Party. Analyses of newspaper coverage and public opinion showed that nonviolence was especially effective when the police and vigilantes responded violently. But when protesters turned violent, white voters were more likely to embrace ‘law and order’ Republicans, helping to swing the 1968 presidential election toward Richard Nixon. In surveys, among Democratic voters who switched from supporting Lyndon Johnson in 1964 to Richard Nixon in 1968, one of the best predictors of party defection was negative attitudes about civil unrest… Nonviolent movements were about twice as likely to succeed as violent ones, largely because a commitment to nonviolent action allowed them to recruit broader support and provoke defections from the opposition.”
Why it matters: “In societies that have a reasonably free press, a persuadable bloc of citizens and free and fair elections, the historical, psychological and political evidence shows that movements are most effective when they remain nonviolent and build broad coalitions. And governments are most vulnerable when their use of force is perceived to be excessive or cruel.”
7. Why Trump’s politicization of the intelligence community should worry us all
Why you should read it: Retired CIA official Brian O’Neill describes for Just Security how the Trump administration is politicizing the intelligence community and its process—and why that’s dangerous for the country.
“The reshaping of the U.S. Intelligence Community (IC) is happening with intent—even if it is not always with strategy—and increasingly out in the open. Since President Donald Trump’s return to office, senior intelligence personnel have been removed, clearances revoked, offices reorganized and analytic teams reassigned, and the infrastructure around finished intelligence has been pulled more tightly under the control of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI)… At the center of these changes are Director of National Intelligence Tulsi Gabbard and CIA Director John Ratcliffe. Gabbard has adopted a more public-facing posture, pairing administrative overhaul with rhetorical framing. Ratcliffe’s approach has been less public, but no less consequential. Together, their early moves echo broader trends across the Cabinet: portraying national security agencies not only as instruments of statecraft, but also as bureaucracies in need of discipline. The message is one of alignment—with the president’s instincts, and with his narrative… What we have seen so far reflects a blend of two dynamics: actions that are performative—intended to signal loyalty—and others that are reflective, aimed at reinforcing the president’s claims and perceptions. Whether these moves are meant as institutional theater or tactical confirmation, the impact is the same: they begin to erode the objective tradecraft critical to offering warning to policymakers.”
“The actions taken in the first months of the Trump administration raise a critical question: are we witnessing a series of reactive measures designed to enforce loyalty and message control or a coherent doctrinal shift in the practice of intelligence? That distinction matters not only for what it reveals about this administration’s view of intelligence, but for what it asks the IC to become. If the goal is not simply to dispute judgments but to recast the community’s function—to shift its role from informing decisions to reinforcing them—then what’s underway is more than restructuring. It’s an effort to redefine the intelligence mission itself… For Gabbard and Ratcliffe, this may not even register as doctrinal change. It is simply the fulfillment of their mandate: to make the IC comport with the president’s will. Whether they call it a doctrine or not is beside the point. The result is the same—an IC reshaped to please, not to warn. In doing so, they erode the very capabilities the system was built to protect.”
Why it matters: “When senior analysts are sidelined, when assessments are filtered to support policy, when the institutions that coordinate long-range warning are pulled under political control—failures cease to be accidental. They become manufactured. In that system, the next intelligence failure will not be a surprise. It will be a choice… And that failure, when it comes, will not be shared. It will belong to the president who demanded to be told only what he wanted to hear.”
8. Why boys fall behind in school before they even start
Why you should read it: Claire Cain Miller shows in the New York Times how pressure for early performance hampers the academic performance of boys, who mature later than girls.
“Girls have been outperforming boys in American schools for decades, from elementary school through college. But the gender gap in education starts even earlier: Boys enter kindergarten less prepared than girls, and this early deficit can compound and help explain some of the recent struggles of boys and young men… Kindergarten has become significantly more academic because of the effects of a national law passed in 2001, with children expected to spend more time sitting still and learning math and reading — and many boys do not enter with the skills to meet those expectations.”
“Adding to that, childhood has changed in recent years in ways that could have set back boys further. The isolation of the pandemic delayed young children’s development, parents are increasingly stressed, and children are spending more time on screens. These factors affect all children, but they may have been particularly hard on boys, who scientists have shown are more vulnerable to hardship… Boys tend to mature later, said Lise Eliot, a professor of neuroscience at Rosalind Franklin University, especially when it comes to executive function — skills like paying attention, regulating emotions and inhibiting inappropriate behaviors… Executive function is crucial for learning and academic success, a variety of research has shown, and the gender gap in when children develop these skills explains much of the achievement gap in early elementary school…
Why it matters: “A powerful way to help boys — and girls too — is to bring back more play into the early years of school, because it’s how young children learn best, researchers and teachers said. Movement, music, time outside, games with peers and activities like puzzles all help children build skills like self-regulation and executive function. Play-based preschool has been shown to shrink gender gaps.”
9. How the Pentagon fueled America’s UFO obsessions
Why you should read it: Wall Street Journal reporters Joel Schectman and Aruna Viswanatha reveal that a small Department of Defense office recently established to look into claims about UFOs found that, in reality, the Pentagon itself fostered these theories to throw people off the scent of classified programs.
“A tiny Pentagon office had spent months investigating conspiracy theories about secret Washington UFO programs when it uncovered a shocking truth: At least one of those theories had been fueled by the Pentagon itself… But the [Air Force] colonel was on a mission—of disinformation. The photos were doctored, the now-retired officer confessed to the Pentagon investigators in 2023. The whole exercise was a ruse to protect what was really going on at Area 51: The Air Force was using the site to develop top-secret stealth fighters, viewed as a critical edge against the Soviet Union. Military leaders were worried that the programs might get exposed if locals somehow glimpsed a test flight of, say, the F-117 stealth fighter, an aircraft that truly did look out of this world. Better that they believe it came from Andromeda.”
“This episode, reported now for the first time, was just one of a series of discoveries the Pentagon team made as it investigated decades of claims that Washington was hiding what it knew about extraterrestrial life. That effort culminated in a report… In fact, a Wall Street Journal investigation reveals, the report itself amounted to a coverup—but not in the way the UFO conspiracy industry would have people believe. The public disclosure left out the truth behind some of the foundational myths about UFOs: The Pentagon itself sometimes deliberately fanned the flames, in what amounted to the U.S. government targeting its own citizens with disinformation… At times, as with the deception around Area 51, military officers spread false documents to create a smokescreen for real secret-weapons programs. In other cases, officials allowed UFO myths to take root in the interest of national security—for instance, to prevent the Soviet Union from detecting vulnerabilities in the systems protecting nuclear installations. Stories tended to take on a life of their own, such as the three-decade journey of a purported piece of space metal that turned out to be nothing of the sort. And one long-running practice was more like a fraternity hazing ritual that spun wildly out of control… The Pentagon omitted key facts in the public version of the 2024 report that could have helped put some UFO rumors to rest, both to protect classified secrets and to avoid embarrassment, the Journal investigation found. The Air Force in particular pushed to omit some details it believed could jeopardize secret programs and damage careers.”
Why it matters: “These findings represent a stunning new twist in the story of America’s cultural obsession with UFOs. In the decades after a 1938 radio broadcast of H.G. Wells’ ‘The War of the Worlds’ spread panic throughout the country, speculation about alien visitors remained largely the province of supermarket tabloids, Hollywood blockbusters and costumed conferences in Las Vegas… Concealing the truth from [military personnel] and deliberate efforts to target the public with disinformation unleashed within the halls of the Pentagon itself a dangerous force, which would become almost unstoppable as decades passed. The paranoid mythology the U.S. military helped spread now has a hold over a growing number of its own senior officials who count themselves as believers.”
Odds and Ends
After 62 years living in Ireland, U2 guitarist the Edge has finally become an Irish citizen…
Paleontologists discover a new distant relative of T. rex: Khankhuuluu mongoliensis…
Good news, everyone! Our Milky Way galaxy may not crash into Andromeda in five billion years after all…
How a Scottish meteorologist made the weather forecast that convinced Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower to go ahead with the D-Day invasion on June 6, 1944…
What I’m Listening To and Watching
Two classic Dio albums: 1983’s Holy Diver and 1984’s The Last in Line.
Walking With Dinosaurs, the new iteration of the classic BBC docuseries that follows dinosaurs like Triceratops, Albertosaurus, and Lusotitan as well as the paleontologists who dig them up.
Ironheart, the Marvel streaming series that follows Riri Williams (Dominique Thorne) as she dives into Chicago’s supernatural criminal underworld to make the money she ends to build her own Iron Man-style superhero armor.
“Strange Brew,” the lead song from Cream’s seminal 1967 album Disraeli Gears.
“Now it’s time,” the final track off Haim’s new album I quit, featuring an interpolation of U2’s “Numb.”
Image of the Month
