The Dive, 4/1/26
Your monthly compilation of what's what on global politics, American society, and an assortment of odds and ends
Quote of the Month
The cherry trees bend over and are shedding On the old road where all that passed are dead, Their petals, strewing the grass as for a wedding This early May morn when there is none to wed. - Edward Thomas, "The Cherry Trees"
What I’m Reading:
1. Why Russia has achieved so little in its war against Ukraine
Why you should read it: In the New York Times, British strategist Lawrence Freedman notes that despite “having all the cards,” as President Trump frequently claims, Russia remains far from achieving anything of substance in Ukraine.
“There is nothing inevitable about a Russian victory in Ukraine. The narrative that Russia has, to quote President Trump, ‘all the cards’ and that Ukraine must make big territorial concessions in order to avoid even worse losses, has dominated negotiations. But at this point in the war, it’s fair to ask: If Russia has all the cards, why has it achieved so little? Why has its progress been so often frustrated by a much smaller army’s resilience and innovative tactics, as well as Russia’s own operational weaknesses?”
“Some of the first steps toward any durable peace agreement are to understand that a Russian victory is not inevitable and to convince Russia of it… Neither President Vladimir Putin’s core military objectives nor his political ones for his special military operation have been met. Ukraine retains its independence. And instead of being demilitarized, it has one of the strongest, largest and most battle-hardened armies in Europe. NATO has expanded to include Sweden and Finland, and Germany is once again becoming a serious military power… Mr. Putin has been ready to pay an extraordinarily heavy price to achieve his geopolitical ambitions. Perhaps that readiness is why whenever the question of whether Russia can keep the war going is posed, the answer invariably comes back that it can. In Moscow, it may not feel like a proper defeat until Russian troops are in full retreat.”
Why it matters: “Russia has failed at much since it began its full-scale invasion in Ukraine, but it has had some success in creating the narrative that its victory in Ukraine is but a matter of time. The first step toward a durable peace is to defeat that narrative: However hard Russia tries and however much pain it inflicts, it cannot subjugate Ukraine.”
2. Why Trump’s war with Iran is strategically incoherent—at best
Why you should read it: International security scholars Richard K. Betts and Stephen Biddle describe the strategic incoherence of Trump’s war with Iran in Foreign Affairs and show how it will prove costly to the United States.
“Contrary to the Trump administration’s callous public relations campaign early in the onslaught against Iran, war is not a movie or a video game. Starting a war is a decision to kill real people, destroy property, and divert limited resources from other priorities. For such moral and material costs to be acceptable, they have to be for a good purpose. No purpose will be good enough, however, unless it is accompanied by a strategy that can achieve that purpose at an acceptable price. Strategy simply means a plan by which military power will produce the desired political result. The war against Iran does not have this… Too often, naive political leaders assume that devastating the enemy militarily necessarily equals strategic success. Purpose and strategy in Iran need to be aligned if there is to be any justification for the current war.“
“The maximum aim of U.S.-engineered regime change appears implausible. The American attack did not just fail to produce a liberal popular uprising ousting the ayatollahs and Revolutionary Guards. If anything, the assault did the reverse, producing an Iranian government even more zealously hostile than the one that was decapitated. So then what about the minimum aim? Again, leave aside the big moral and economic costs. Smashing up Iran will not sufficiently reduce its ability—or its incentive, too often ignored by analysts—to damage U.S. interests. Instead, it merely displaces that purpose by exaggerating the benefits of a temporary tactical success while energizing Iran’s determination to fight back… The benefit of periodically returning to war would be to blunt Iran’s military recovery and nuclear reconstitution. Without massive on-the-ground inspections, the question on each occasion would remain how effective the blunting was. In June 2025, Trump declared the Iranian nuclear program to have been ‘obliterated,’ only to decide less than a year later that it had to be struck again. It will hardly be a surprise if the same ineffectiveness of preventive war will have to be faced when the dust settles after the current one. Keeping the Iranian threat subdued is an open-ended strategy. Iran’s incentives to keep some nuclear option open compete with U.S. and Israeli incentives to close it. Iran presumably sees its incentives as existential, especially given the war’s stated ambition for regime change and the targeted killings of Iran’s leaders. Which side’s incentives to indefinitely bear the costs of recurrent war are greater?… If the benefit of indefinite conflict with Iran is low, the cost should also be low. It is not. In just its first weeks, the war has cost many billions of dollars in direct expenditure, reduced support for Ukraine, put dangerous strains on inventories of the most advanced U.S. weapons, and shocked the global economy.”
Why it matters: “Launching a preventive war was a bad decision in the first place. It undercut whatever claims to American moral leadership in the world that had remained under Trump. It showed other countries that reliance on U.S. power in the face of American adventurism leaves them vulnerable to severe economic disruption. It yoked U.S. national interests to Israel’s, which differ in kind and degree. It left the Iranian people holding the bag when Trump’s promises that ‘help is on its way’ proved hollow…The huge human and economic costs of the war and a naive strategy for achieving either its maximum or minimum objectives leave the United States with the prospect of managing a postwar landscape that could be as problematic as the one before it.”
3. Why an Iran war oil shock is on the way
Why you should read it: In an interview with Harvard Business Review, oil analyst Rory Johnston explains to journalist Thomas Stackpole how Trump’s war with Iran and the closure of the Strait of Hormuz will lead to an oil shock of the sort unseen in decades.
“Now, the important thing to remember about the global oil system is that it’s essentially a flowing chemistry set. It needs to keep flowing at a steady pace, and any big changes in that flow rate cause a bunch of chaos all through the system. That air pocket [created by the blocked supply of Gulf oil] is important because we still had tankers leaving the Gulf three weeks ago, and it’s probably going to take another week, week-and-a-half for those to finally hit land. After that, the air pocket starts really actually hammering local available supply. That’s when we’re going to start drawing down inventories very quickly… The first domino is that air pocket finally hitting. From there, I think the next big domino is going to be the market reaction, because once that physical scarcity starts to rapidly draw down inventories, there’s kind of no escaping what we are facing. Global financial markets, and particularly the paper [financial] side of the futures market, seem like they’re still in a little bit of disbelief. There’s a well-entrenched belief that, even if it is happening, [U.S President Donald] Trump’s going to wrap this up at any second.”
“There’s a lot of alarmism in the oil market. I like to think of myself as a non-alarmist oil analyst. I’m usually the person who talks about how the system is so impressive and so dynamic in its ability to adapt to shocks. But this is just such a big shock that rather than bending, I fear it will break the system. Only I think a lot of generalist observers aren’t accepting that because, very frankly, people in the oil sector always say that everything is an existential threat. Now, we’re in a boy who cried wolf situation… In this context, ‘break’ fundamentally means demand destruction. Typically, higher prices can incentivize suppliers to realign logistics and trade routes to allow more supply, even with the same amount of production behind it. But all of those things are insufficient for the loss we’re currently facing. If we continue down this path, prices will need to rise to such a level as to actually force a physical, volumetric reduction in demand.”
Why it matters: “In this situation, if the Strait remains closed, the price is just going to keep rising and rising and rising until you get fewer planes in the air and fewer people driving. And I think that is the kind of situation we’re kind of looking at now… It’s a completely untenable situation. I think that markets are treading water, waiting for the physics of these markets to force people’s hands. Because I think at that stage there’s no amount of jawboning that the White House can do that can counteract 10 million barrel a day draws in Asia. I think that the markets coming to terms with the physical reality of what’s happening is what people have to wait for now.”
4. What happens when a team of narcissists goes to war
Why you should read it: New York Times columnist Jamelle Bouie details what happens when a president who lacks a theory of mind and a cabinet of social media-addled trolls decide to go to war.
“If you can set aside both the unconstitutionality and the immorality of President Trump’s unprovoked war on Iran and focus on the operation itself, it is hard not to be bewildered by the utter lack of real planning or even basic strategic thinking that has gone into it… To read about the administration’s decision-making process is to learn that it did not really plan for or expect much in the way of anything that now defines the war… It appears that both the president and the White House expected token resistance, followed by the collapse of the Iranian regime, the installation of a pro-American government — or at least one we could tolerate — and a return to the status quo ante: a replay, in essence, of the president’s first intervention of the year, in Venezuela. Now that this replay fantasy has collided with a more complex, indeterminate and difficult reality, Trump is unable to explain his objectives or even give the country a sense of when the war might end. He told Fox News radio that he would ‘feel it in my bones.’ Let’s just say that that is a far cry from traditional political leadership during wartime.”
“What’s striking is how familiar this pattern feels. The administration did not expect the public to be repelled by DOGE. It did not expect outrage over the treatment of Kilmar Abrego Garcia. It did not expect Democrats to respond to threats of partisan gerrymandering with their own push to wring as many Democratic seats as possible out of so-called blue states. The administration certainly did not expect the mass mobilizations against the deployment of National Guard troops and the use of Immigration and Customs Enforcement and Customs and Border Protection as a roving paramilitary force. Minnesota, in particular, appears to have caught them entirely off guard — a tendency toward docility, it seems, is their base-line assumption about everyone they oppose… Why can’t the White House see what others could have easily predicted? None of this should have been a surprise. Anyone capable of thinking through the actions of other people — of imagining their perspectives and of recognizing that they have agency — should have been able to anticipate these outcomes and plan accordingly. And in the case of the war in Iran, the president ignored counsel that warned of something like the current situation.”
Why it matters: “This gets to the real problem. Trump is famously indifferent to the concerns of those around him. He is a consummate narcissist, and he is, without question, the most solipsistic person ever to occupy the Oval Office. Over his decades on the public stage, we have seen little to no evidence that he believes in the existence of other minds… By virtue of his position, Trump is a dangerous figure. But he is also a weak and deeply unpopular president. The upshot of his impenetrable egotism, for his opponents, is that there are plenty of opportunities to make him weaker and even more unpopular. For as much as he is in love with violence — for as much as he clearly wants to terrorize the nation into submission — he is also cursed with a kind of blindness. He cannot see that his opposition is real. He cannot see that it can act.”
5. How two-and-a-half years of near-constant war has left Israel exhausted and anxious
Why you should read it: Jerusalem-based journalist Gershom Gorenberg reports for The Atlantic from an Israel that’s been stuck in a seemingly endless loop of anxiety since the October 7, 2023 attacks.
“In Israel these days, unless your apartment has a blast-resistant room, it’s best to go to bed in something that you’re comfortable wearing in a bomb shelter. Your phone is likely to wake you with the clatter of an alert for incoming missiles: First comes a text message that says to be near a protected area. Several minutes later, a second screech brings a message to take cover… In our lives, the current war has gone on for two and a half years, with intermissions just long enough to raise hope of normalcy that is shattered when fighting resumes. This morning’s siren is a replay of June’s siren, and the siren of autumn 2024, and that of autumn 2023. This is not a new war. It is the same war on a loop of exhaustion, adrenaline, and worry for your children. To those feelings I must add despair and frustration with the apparent determination of my government to maintain the loop endlessly.”
“Throughout Netanyahu’s career, his signature sleight of mind has been to divert attention from the unresolved conflict with the Palestinians by shouting ‘Iran!’ loudly and often. Then Israel was taken by surprise on October 7, and the prime minister avoided accountability for that intelligence failure by keeping the war going—in part by constantly changing the conditions for a cease-fire. Now he has combined both magic tricks… War is three-card monte with Netanyahu as the dealer. Strikes on Tehran divert news coverage from the bills that the ruling coalition has introduced to disempower the attorney general and subject the broadcast media to government control. A mass protest against the government was supposed to take place on the night of February 28: It never happened, because missiles began falling that morning. Most dangerous of all, those missiles are driving to the far margins of public attention the escalating campaign of terror that West Bank settlers are carrying out against Palestinian villages, with the acquiescence, or worse, of the Israeli army.”
Why it matters: “Such callousness is the leitmotif of two and a half years of war under Netanyahu. It is also the opposite of the core value of Israeli society, weakly translated as ‘solidarity’: the conviction that each of us is in this not for herself or himself but for one another. That cohesion has always been a national strength not measurable in warplanes or divisions. Netanyahu has fractured it… A more objective indicator of the effect of the long war might be the sharp rise in emigration. Last year, according to the state’s Central Bureau of Statistics, nearly 51,000 more Israelis emigrated than returned from abroad. In the years before 2023, the number was about a third of that… This does not mean that Israel is emptying out. But it does hint at malaise, at doubts about the future. It suggests that war without a perceivable endpoint has the same effect as a missile falling far enough away from a building to leave it standing but close enough to create thin fissures.“
6. What AI hypists don’t get
Why you should read it: Francis Fukuyama argues on his Substack that there are some problems in the real world that the current crop of artificial intelligence models just can’t solve—both in principle and in practice.
“Recently I heard a presentation by an engineer from OpenAI about the incredible transformations that will occur once we get to artificial general intelligence (AGI), or even superintelligence. He said that this will quickly solve many of the world’s problems: GDP growth rates could rise to 10, 15, even 20 percent per year, diseases will be cured, education revolutionized, and cities in the developing world will be transformed with clean drinking water for everyone… It is hard to see how even the most superintelligent AI is going to help solve these problems. And this points to a central conceit that plagues the whole AI field: a gross overestimation of the value of intelligence by itself to solve problems… Many of the enthusiasts hyping AI’s capabilities think of policy problems as if they were long-standing problems in mathematics that human beings had great difficulties solving, such as the four-color map theorem or the Cap Set problem. But math problems are entirely cognitive in nature and it is not surprising that AI could make advances in that realm. The people building AI systems are themselves very smart mathematically, and tend to overvalue the importance of this kind of pure intelligence.”
“It is not just political and social obstacles that AI has difficulty dealing with; LLMs have limited ability to directly manipulate physical objects. AI interacts with the physical world primarily through robotics, but the latter is a field that has lagged considerably behind the development of LLMs. Robots have proliferated enormously over the past decades and are omnipresent in manufacturing, agriculture, and many other domains. But the vast majority of today’s robots are programmed by human beings to do a limited range of very specific tasks. The world was wowed recently by Chinese humanoid robots doing kung fu moves, but I suspect the robots didn’t teach themselves how to act this way… Here’s an example of AI’s current limitations. I recently had an HVAC contractor replace the furnace in my house. The contractor photographed and measured the house’s layout; he had to route the new ducts and wiring in ways specific to my house’s design. It turned out that the new furnace would not fit through the existing attic door; he had to cut a larger opening with a reciprocating saw, and then repair the doorframe after the new unit was inside. There is no robot in the world that could do what my contractor did, and it is very hard to imagine a robot acquiring such abilities anytime in the near future, with or without AGI. Robots may get there eventually, but that level of human capacity remains a distant objective.”
Why it matters: “Policy problems are different. They require connection to the real world, whether that’s physical objects or entrenched stakeholders who don’t necessarily want changes to occur. As the economic historian Joel Mokyr has shown, earlier technological revolutions took years and decades to materialize after the initial scientific and engineering breakthroughs were made, because those abstract ideas had to be implemented on a widespread basis in real world conditions. AI may move faster on a cognitive level, but it may not be able to solve implementation problems more quickly than in previous historical periods… But the kind of explosive, self-reinforcing AI advances that some observers predict are on the way will still have to solve implementation problems for which machines are not well suited. A ten percent annual growth rate will double GDP in seven years. Yet planet Earth will not remotely yield the materials—water, land, minerals, energy, or people—to make this come about, no matter how smart our machines get.”
7. How AI companies exploit other people’s intellectual property but jealously guard their own
Why you should read it: In The Atlantic, staff writer Alex Reisner outlines how big tech companies steal the intellectual property of other people to build their own AI models while zealously and hypocritically protecting their own intellectual property.
“In April 2024, Eric Schmidt, the former Google CEO and a current AI evangelist, gave a closed-door lecture to a group of Stanford students. If these young people hoped to be Silicon Valley entrepreneurs, Schmidt explained, then they should be prepared to breach some ethical boundaries… When I recently obtained a copy, I was struck by Schmidt’s readiness to say the quiet part out loud. He was articulating an attitude that is common in Silicon Valley but is usually stated as a legal or philosophical argument. When I reached one of Schmidt’s spokespeople, they defended his position by telling me that Schmidt believes that the ‘fair use’ of copyrighted work drives innovation. Others in the industry have cited the techno-libertarian idea that ‘information wants to be free,’ a frequently misunderstood credo that portrays information as a natural resource that should flow without restriction… But the credo never seems to apply to Silicon Valley’s own information, whether it’s the troves of personal data that companies have collected about us or the software they write. Photoshop, for example, doesn’t want to be free. In fact, Photoshop is one of thousands of tech-industry products that are protected by patents. Inventions such as Google’s original search algorithm and even design details, such as the ‘rounded rectangle’ shape of Apple’s iPhone, have also been patented, and companies employ teams of high-end attorneys to prosecute infringements.”
“In the pursuit of generative AI, tech companies have recently turned their aggressive [IP] strategies toward less prepared industries. As my reporting has shown, many top AI models have been trained on data sets containing massive numbers of copyrighted books, videos, and other works. This large-scale piracy has been excused in a number of ways: OpenAI (which has a corporate partnership with The Atlantic’s business team) has claimed that the company uses ‘publicly available information’ to train its models; Anthropic has said that it has used books, but not in any commercial products; and Meta admits that it has used books in commercial products, but that doing so was ‘quintessential fair use…’ Even as they claim the right to train their models on work belonging to other people, the AI companies have rejected similar reasoning when it comes to their own products. Consider OpenAI’s terms of service for ChatGPT, which forbid use of the bot’s ‘output to develop models that compete with OpenAI.’ Anthropic, Google, and xAI have similar clauses forbidding people from using the material generated by their chatbots to train competing products. In other words: We can train on your work, but you can’t train on ours.”
Why it matters: ““t’s worth noting that Silicon Valley has itself regularly been a victim of IP theft, in the form of software piracy. Partially in response to that problem, major companies have changed how software is distributed. Today, you cannot just buy Adobe Photoshop: Instead, you pay a rental fee to access the program, which verifies your license every time you use it. Microsoft has taken a similar approach with the 365 version of its Office suite, and Google’s office software can’t be downloaded at all. These companies have made their IP harder to steal by developing new methods of controlling access—an option that is not realistically available to the artists, authors, and open-source-software developers they take material from… Given the double standard, it’s difficult to tell whether Silicon Valley’s arguments about fair use are genuine or just legally expedient. On one hand, generative AI is a new technology that raises new questions about the use of copyrighted work. On the other hand, the AI industry’s aggressive approach is business as usual for Silicon Valley: moving fast and breaking things. And betting that the lawyers can ‘clean the mess up.’”
8. How influencers are infesting our politics
Why you should read it: The Bulwark columnist Lauren Egan prophesies a coming dark age of influencer and content-creator inflected politics.
“For many Democratic officials, the Texas [Senate primary] episode was a startling example of the new challenges that campaigns face. Social media influencers who are posting about and even covering their races are playing by a looser set of rules and ethics than conventional journalists. And their impact is often many magnitudes greater as voters increasingly turn to social media and short-form videos for their news. The situation in Texas underscored just how tricky the relationship can be between campaigns and those influencers who are often incentivized to start drama that gains them clout, followers, and money… While some well-known influencers like Carlos Eduardo Espina—who has 22 million followers across TikTok, Instagram, and Facebook—tend to be less catty and more professional, the operatives I talked to say the majority don’t exhibit those traits. And they emphasized that the internet is teeming with thousands of micro- and nano-influencers looking to make a name for themselves.”
“As the midterms get nearer, campaigns are scrambling to figure out how to navigate these relationships. There are basic organizational questions that have to be sorted out, such as who on the campaign should manage creators… Aside from the issue of editorial standards, there are also questions about money and transparency. The Federal Election Commission does not require influencers to disclose when they are paid to promote political candidates or causes, which has allowed a network of dark money groups to buy online influence almost unnoticed. Some Democratic staffers said creators have demanded campaigns pay them thousands of dollars to post a positive video and threatened to go negative on those campaigns if they don’t agree to the fee… The opaqueness of the political influencer market incentivizes everyone to get in on the game. No candidate can know for sure that their primary opponents aren’t using social media pay-to-play against them. So the safe bet is to quietly hire some social media champions of their own.”
Why it matters: “Between the prisoner’s dilemma of buying social clout and the amount of money that right-leaning groups are apparently spending on online influence, Democrats have plenty of reason to believe that they have to figure out how to work with content creators, however painful (or expensive) that process might be.”
9. How Trump is doing to Washington, DC what Mussolini did to Rome
Why you should read it: In the New York Times, architecture critic Paul Goldberger compares Trump’s campaign to remake Washington, DC in his own garish and tasteless image with Mussolini’s similar attempt to put a Fascist stamp on Rome a century ago.
“President Trump’s attempt to hugely expand the White House is lumbering forward. It suffered the tiniest of setbacks when the National Capital Planning Commission decided to postpone a vote on the project to its next meeting, on April 2. But it is highly unlikely that the commission, which has been stocked with Trump appointees, will not ultimately sign off on this enormous, banal box in a vaguely classical style that, if it goes forward, will overwhelm the White House and block the view between the White House and the Capitol that has been one of Washington’s signature vistas for more than two centuries… As with most of the destructive and divisive actions that the president has committed America to this year, it is not a solution to a real problem at all but the cover for a deeper desire, which in this case is to remake official Washington in his image. The ballroom is bombastic architecture pretending to be genteel.”
“It brings to mind not any previous American president but the Italian dictator Benito Mussolini, who was obsessed with rebuilding Rome into some grand new version of itself. In 1924, two years after coming into absolute power, in a talk at the Campidoglio in the city’s historic center, he said, ‘It is necessary to liberate from the mediocre disfigurements of the old Rome.’ He added, ‘Rome cannot, must not be, only a modern city in the by now banal sense of the word. It must be a city worthy of its glory.’ Rome needed, he said, more grandezza — more grandeur… As Mussolini saw Rome as a mere shadow of its ancient self, Mr. Trump sees Washington as a city insufficiently grand for his ambitions. As a builder, he has always confused size with excellence — he would often give the floors in his skyscrapers falsely high numbers to make the buildings seem taller than they were — and when he looks at Washington, he probably really believes that it is a bit humdrum and lacking in panache, as if the founding fathers could not imagine something as noble as Mr. Trump has in mind... Disorder, real or imagined, is the lifeblood of authoritarians, since they often come to power on the promise that they alone can turn chaos into order. And if those who strive for power have been known to exaggerate political disorder — or even, at times, stir it up themselves to create a pretext to impose their authority — they are every bit as likely to claim that the great cities they occupy are cesspools of decay and decline that cry out desperately for their transformational urban planning and architectural skills, which they tend to believe are as great as their political ones.”
Why it matters: “In his attempt to make Rome imperial again, Mussolini profoundly misread Rome, which was never what he thought it was. It has always been a city of great monuments without monumental settings, a place of magnificent accidents. The essence of Rome is the way in which most of its greatest buildings hit you by surprise as you make your way through the complex maze of narrow, winding streets. It is in this that the city’s magic lies. Rome, even under the emperors, was a city of accretion, not a city of order… As Mussolini misunderstood Rome, Mr. Trump misunderstands Washington. Washington was conceived as an expression of democracy, a place in which the largest and grandest public building was the Capitol, where the representatives of the people gathered. The White House is a mansion, not a palace; it is large compared with the average house of its time, but it was never intended to intimidate… Right now, the future of our nation’s capital is being guided not by any legitimate system of architectural review but by sycophants who want only to please their leader. It’s just how things worked under Mussolini in Rome, until his power came to an end.”
Odds and Ends
How ancient DNA confirms humans domesticated dogs before they discovered agriculture…
Why an underwater neutrino telescope may have detected a previously unobserved but theoretically possible exploding black hole…
How a recently-discovered medieval Byzantine shipwreck sheds light on Europe’s dark ages…
Why it’s harder than you might think to design an aesthetically pleasing and, more importantly, functional steering wheel…
A new study finds that a third of sharks in the Bahamas test positive for painkillers and cocaine…
What I’m Listening To and Watching
Revisiting the bulk of Star Trek: Voyager, the fourth iteration of the science-fiction franchise that sees a Federation starship working its way back home after being stranded on the other side of the galaxy.
Ghost Elephants, the latest documentary from illustrious and idiosyncratic German filmmaker Werner Herzog that’s as much about the KhoiSan and Luchazi people of the Kalahari as conservation biologist Steve Boyes’s quest to track down the world’s largest elephants.
The revival of the 2000s medical sitcom Scrubs, starring Zach Braff, Sarah Chalke, and Donald Faison as quirky but hard-working doctors John Dorian, Elliot Reid, and Christopher Turk.
The dulcet tones of Morgan Freeman narrate The Dinosaurs, a four-part Netflix documentary that traces the rise, reign, and ultimate demise of everyone’s favorite terrible lizards.
Young Sherlock sees the titular hero (Hero Fiennes Tiffin) and his BFF James Moriarty (Dónal Finn) unravel an international conspiracy that’s intertwined with Holmes family secrets.
Image of the Month
