Quote of the Month
“If we put as much serious effort into our work as senators put into what they’re intent on, we too probably would have achieved some degree of success.” - Epictetus, Discourses, I.10.1
My Recent Writing:
What I’m Reading:
1. Why America now faces the tyranny of the minority
Why you should read it: Washington Post columnist Fareed Zakaria argues that American politics has so benefitted the extremes in recent decades that the country is on the verge of a full-blown tyranny of the minority.
“The primary system American parties use to choose their candidates is extremely unusual; no other major democracy has one quite like it. Primaries ensure that the candidates chosen are selected by slivers of the parties — around 20 percent of all eligible voters. And this selection is not at all representative — these are the most intense, agitated activists, often far more extreme in their views than run-of-the-mill registered Republicans or Democrats. Add to this decades of sophisticated, computer-enabled gerrymandering, and you get extreme candidates who run in safe districts where the only threat to them is a primary candidate who is even more extreme… But between primaries and gerrymandering, the majority view gets drowned out. Catering to the right-wing base means constantly ratcheting up the rhetoric: Nancy Pelosi is a would-be dictator, Biden is a communist, Democrats are pro-criminal. ‘Democrats want Republicans dead,’ says Marjorie Taylor Greene, ‘and they have already started the killings.’”
“The alternative system of candidate selection, used in the United States before the era of primaries and in most other major democracies, is what is often called the ‘smoke-filled room’ (a pejorative description even before we knew that smoking kills you). In this system, candidates are selected by party bosses. But consider who these ‘bosses’ have traditionally been: aldermen, mayors, governors and legislators. These are people who have won general elections by appealing to the entire electorate, people who have a feel for the broader public. (No group of party elders would ever choose a candidate like Herschel Walker.) Primaries, by contrast, entrust candidate selection to the most radical section of the party. Social media has added fuel to the fire by amplifying the noisiest and angriest voices within the party, who are themselves an even smaller group than primary voters.”
Why it matters: “It is not an accident that Germany and France have both been run largely by solid centrists in a time of populism. They have chosen to keep to the old system of democracy based on the principle of majority rule. In the United States, and to an extent in Britain, democracy has become minority rule, and the minority holding power is unrepresentative, angry and increasingly radical.”
2. Nobody likes Russia and China
Why you should read it: Despite their much-ballyhooed public diplomacy and disinformation campaigns, National Endowment for Democracy vice president Christopher Walker notes in Foreign Policy that publics around the world don’t much care for either China or Russia.
“China, Russia, and other countries ruled by repressive regimes have dramatically scaled up their investment in instruments commonly associated with soft power. Despite the vast resources these authoritarian trendsetters have poured into media, education, technology, and entertainment, public opinion surveys suggest that they are largely failing to generate soft power: the ability to get people to view a country positively and obtain preferred outcomes by attraction rather than coercion…Recently released survey data from the Pew Research Center illustrates the conundrum. As the leadership in Beijing rolls out the red carpet in advance of the 20th Party Congress, it shows in China’s case that negative views predominate, some at “historic highs,” across a diverse set of foreign publics assessed. Among citizens of Sweden and Canada, 83 percent and 74 percent, respectively, view China unfavorably, as do 86 percent of Australians and 80 percent of South Koreans.”
“So what are the possible explanations for the autocrats’ largely unimpressive return on their investment for foreign influence? Several factors contribute to this contradiction… First, the dynamics of soft power—which arise principally from a country’s culture, its political values, and its policies—are misaligned with the incentives of systems based on pervasive state control and repression… When these regimes pursue outward-facing engagement, the state’s firm hand does not magically disappear… In principle, the Chinese or Russia leaderships could boost their soft power by relaxing their grip on civil society and easing systematic repression on independent media and opposition figures. In practice, there is little evidence to suggest they are inclined to do so. In China’s case, David Bandurski 10 years ago shrewdly identified the dilemma of why the authorities have little soft power to show for their massive outward-facing media investments, writing how the Chinese leadership ‘is determined to control the ‘voice’ of China—as though it were not the product of the full complexity of China’s culture and ideas, but rather a megaphone to shout over the heads of international audiences.’”
Why it matters: “…the metrics commonly used to identify soft power at work are ill-suited to the task of assessing the nature of China and Russia’s foreign influence. Public opinion surveys, which have served as the go-to measure for soft power success, may be able to reveal a given country’s favorability among certain audiences. They are not, however, an appropriate instrument for measuring the extent to which a foreign power is coopting local elites, inducing forms of political censorship, or is engaging in strategic corruption that can compromise the integrity of local institutions… Open societies will be vulnerable so long as they maintain a blind spot about the compromising and corrosive aspects of authoritarians’ outward-facing influence. Rather than devoting so much energy to figuring out why the likes of China and Russia are so inept at exerting soft power, scholars and journalists instead need to extend their field of vision to the increasingly evident, yet still poorly understood, authoritarian strategies that prioritize corrosion and control over attraction and persuasion.”
3. How shaming and shunning Russian elites harms Putin
Why you should read it: In Foreign Affairs, Alexander Cooley and Brooke Harrington contend that the widespread shaming and shunning of Russian elites via “stigma-based sanctions” that followed Moscow’s February invasion of Ukraine has slowly but surely begun taking a toll on the Kremlin.
“Pariah status is a powerful motivator in foreign affairs. Being expelled by an international community of peers can irreversibly damage the reputation of countries and individuals alike. Yet the impact of stigma remains underappreciated by policymakers and scholars. Many Western commentators have been skeptical about the individual sanctions imposed on Russia’s oligarchs following the invasion of Ukraine, which included freezing assets, blocking transactions, and banning travel… Unlike traditional economic or political sanctions, which seek to coerce or punish governments and thus change their conduct, status-based sanctions are designed to destabilize rogue regimes by fragmenting the interests of elites. The objective is not to produce a specific change in regime conduct but to compel elites to distance themselves from the regime and withdraw their unwavering public support, shattering the illusion of control that sustains strongmen such as Russian President Vladimir Putin—and, eventually, making them vulnerable to being deposed… Imposing the ‘social death’ of stigmatization widens divisions within targeted regimes, deters international allies from providing support, and ultimately makes strongmen look impotent and isolated. Any of these mechanisms can hasten regime collapse.”
“Stigmatization is a ritualized collective act that requires public repudiations from multiple actors. During the week following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, hundreds of Western companies unexpectedly and abruptly announced that they were suspending operations in Russia or withdrawing permanently from the Russian markets. These included not only global consumer giants such as IKEA and McDonald’s but also energy companies, including BP and ExxonMobil, that had weathered almost every type of political risk over their decades-long involvement in Russia. Thus far, over 1,000 Western firms have publicized the closure of their offices in Russia. International cultural and sporting organizations have also jumped on the bandwagon: Western orchestras have stopped performing the works of Russian composers such as Tchaikovsky, and Russian athletes were excluded from events such as soccer’s World Cup and Formula One auto races. The collective and immediate show of opprobrium and moral revulsion by Western governments, corporations, and cultural bodies meted out wide-reaching and consequential stigmatization… But stigmatization can be much more effective when aimed at prominent individuals rather than at a country. The impact of shame-based sanctions on elites can be judged by the significant risks that a handful of Russian oligarchs took in trying to stigma-proof themselves shortly after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine began.”
Why it matters: “Neither the stigmatization of his oligarch allies nor the cold shoulder from his erstwhile international partners has convinced Putin to withdraw from Ukraine. But domestic and international elites continue to distance themselves from a regime that is increasingly isolated and in apparent disarray. This elite defiance seems to be trickling down, in a pattern similar to that which occurred during the fall of other autocrats, spelling major trouble for the regime… The impact of shame-based sanctions on influential Russians—and their knock-on effects for both domestic compliance and international alliances—suggests that this tool has significant value for policymakers, especially when dealing with authoritarian kleptocracies such as those in Kazakhstan, North Korea, and Turkey. Autocrats in those places are nervously watching what is happening to the Kremlin and wondering just how long they could survive as pariahs.”
4. Why China’s economy won’t overtake the United States until 2060, if ever
Why you should read it: For the Financial Times, Rockefeller International chair Ruchir Sharma details the emerging consensus that China’s economy will no longer overtake the United States any time soon - if ever.
“As he embarks on a third term, Xi Jinping’s goal is to make China a mid-level developed country in the next decade, which implies that the economy will need to expand at a rate of around 5 per cent. But underlying trends — bad demographics, heavy debt and declining productivity growth — suggest the country’s overall growth potential is about half that rate… The implications of China growing at 2.5 per cent have yet to be fully digested anywhere, including Beijing. For one thing, assuming that the US grows at 1.5 per cent, with similar rates of inflation and a stable exchange rate, China would not overtake America as the world’s largest economy until 2060, if ever.”
“China is now a middle-income country, a stage when many economies naturally start to slow given the higher base. Its per capita income is currently $12,500, one-fifth that of the US. There are 38 advanced economies today, and all of them grew past the $12,500 income level in the decades after the second world war — most quite gradually. Only 19 grew at 2.5 per cent or faster for the next 10 years, and did so with a boost from more workers; on average the working age population grew at 1.2 per cent a year. Only two (Lithuania and Latvia) had a shrinking workforce… In this situation, 2.5 per cent growth will be an achievement. Sustaining basic productivity growth of 0.7 per cent will barely offset population decline. To hit 5 per cent GDP growth, China would need capital growth rates near those of the 2010s. Most of that money went into physical infrastructure: roads, bridges and housing. Given the scale of the housing bust, it’s likely overall capital growth will fall back to about 2.5 per cent.”
Why it matters: “If anything, 2.5 per cent is an optimistic forecast that plays down the risks to growth, including growing tensions between China and its major trade partners, growing government interference in the most productive private sector — technology — and mounting concerns about the debt load… China at 2.5 per cent growth has major implications for its ambitions as an economic, diplomatic and military superpower. A lesser China is more likely than the world yet realises.”
5. Why Iran’s ongoing anti-regime protests represent a generational revolt
Why you should read it: In The Atlantic, journalist Kim Ghattas writes that the anti-regime protests that erupted in Iran are the leading edge of a region-wide generational revolt against the Islamic Republic and its allies.
“‘From Beirut to Tehran, one revolution that does not die,’ people chanted on the streets of Beirut during a wave of protests against Lebanon’s corrupt politicians in October 2019… The protesters were not chanting in support of the revolution that turned Iran into a theocracy in 1979, but against an Islamic Republic that oppresses its people at home and wields power well beyond its borders. They were singling out a foreign government that upholds dysfunctional political systems in other countries so that it can manipulate them to its advantage and deploys proxy militias that mete out violence from Baghdad to Beirut against those who rise in opposition to Tehran’s dark worldview. The protests in Lebanon, which were only partially focused on Iran, were taking place just as Iraqis were marching through the streets across their country, openly protesting Iran’s stranglehold over their politics, their economy, and their clerical establishment. Meanwhile, Iranians, angered by an increase in fuel prices, were chanting ‘Death to the dictator’ and setting dozens of government sites on fire.”
“Protesters are back in the streets across Iran, picking up where they left off two years ago, their lives and prospects having deteriorated in the interim. And just as in 2019, we are witnessing expressions of solidarity across the Middle East, where many, impressed by the courage of Iranian women in particular, are cheering the protesters on… Now, from Baghdad to Beirut, those who oppose Tehran are exploring the possibility that the protests might help weaken Iran’s grip on what it considers its forward defense bases: Lebanon, Iraq, Syria, and, to some extent, Yemen. So far, in all these countries, no one has found a local mechanism to outmaneuver Iran—it can only come as a result of changes in Tehran.”
Why it matters: “…something feels like it’s coming undone, as though the project of the Islamic Republic is running out of steam and the black wave unleashed by the 1979 revolution is ebbing, exhausted by recurrent protests, building on top of one another since 2009, and reaching new heights since 2017. Iran is in a constant state of ebullition—hundreds of protests take place across the country on a regular basis, even though they don’t all make headlines. The repeated challenges to Iran’s hegemonic ambitions along its periphery are also unprecedented… I fear that the outcome in Iran could look like Syria, but the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps will most likely try to use the Egypt playbook and save the edifice of the state—light on religion and heavy on repression. However the next few weeks and months unfold in Iran, the repercussions will extend beyond its borders.”
6. How credentialed gatekeepers became the enforcers of woke orthodoxy
Why you should read it: Tablet columnist Michael Lind outlines how “obscure concepts in politicized university departments like gender studies and ethnic studies became orthodoxy not only in the academy, media, and the nonprofit sector, but also in the boardrooms of national and global corporations, banks, and in professional associations like the American Bar and Medical associations."
“Seeking historical analogies for this sudden revolution in American institutional life, some spoke of the Great Awokening, alluding to the two Great Awakenings that animated Anglo-American Protestantism in the 18th and 19th centuries. A case can indeed be made that wokeness is a secular religion, complete with its own ersatz rituals, like ‘taking the knee,’ invoking the imminent apocalypse of anthropogenic climate change, and icons of George Floyd, a victim of police brutality who was elevated into a martyr… Nevertheless, the Great Awokening is a misleading term. Woke activists are not honest missionaries; they are infiltrators, acting with the specific goal of seizing control of institutions and imposing their views on others. Unlike the Protestant evangelists of the Great Awakenings, today’s activists do not use simple language to spread their message to sinners in need of repentance. On the contrary, they camouflage radical beliefs in bureaucratic acronyms like DEI and CRT, and anodyne-sounding terms like ‘gender-affirming health care’—in practice, often a euphemism for castrating boys and men and sterilizing and performing irreversible mastectomies on girls and women. Where Protestant evangelists sought voluntary and whole-hearted conversion, the new activists seek submission, imposed on penalty of ostracism… If these activists are not evangelists, what are they? They are ‘entryists.’ The term ‘entryism’ has been associated with the Trotskyist denomination of Marxism since the 1930s, when the exiled Leon Trotsky urged his followers in Britain to infiltrate the Labour Party and influence it from within, rather than form their own small, ineffectual party. But the tactic is not limited to the political left. In the United States there have been cases in which Protestant fundamentalists ran for local school boards as moderates and then, once they had majorities on the board, used their power for goals like teaching “creation science” along with evolutionary biology… Today’s illiberal radicals, like yesterday’s communists, have profited from a ‘no enemies to the left’ policy among liberals. Mild-mannered liberals and progressives believe in civil rights, so therefore something called ‘anti-racism’ must be worth supporting, even if there are a few problems here and there: Ibram X. Kendi’s sectarian lunacy thus hitches a free ride on the legacy of Martin Luther King Jr. Similarly, adding ‘T’ and ‘Q’ to LGB legitimated public acceptance of radical gender ideology, as though insisting that controversial and often dangerous ‘gender transitions’ are a natural and unobjectionable continuation of the campaign to allow same-sex couples to marry.”
“Control of three gateways in particular has been critical to the success of woke entryism. The three gateways are college education, professional accreditation, and commercial services, particularly new online media platforms like Twitter, sales platforms like Amazon, and financial platforms like PayPal. All three wield variants of the same power: the power to exclude people from the economy. Good Trotsky-style entryists that they are, woke activists, knowing that they would be defeated in free elections and in open public debates, have sought to infiltrate institutions to control key chokepoints or gateways, which empower them to be gatekeepers… unlike a generation ago, young Americans typically must pass through three gateways, in order to be economically successful. They must obtain college diplomas; they must join professional accrediting organizations; and they must be able to do business via platforms in the marketplace…Waiting for people at each gateway, like trolls under a bridge in a fairy tale, are woke leftists, who demand that they recite the in-group passwords before they are allowed to pass through the gates. What makes these gateways particularly vulnerable to capture by disciplined, zealous entryists in the United States is the fact that they are mostly private and unregulated. America’s most prestigious universities are private, and they set the standards for other universities in the country, both private and public. Whether private or public, all American universities are accredited by private, nonprofit accrediting agencies and not by America’s federal or state governments… The increasing polarization of the American class system along educational lines, along with a massive oversupply of college graduates for too few jobs that actually require college degrees, breeds conformity and submission in undergraduates. In the 1990s, you could mock your politically correct professor or classmates and go on to a successful career in law, medicine, business, or even the academy. In the 2020s, if you mock your politically correct professor or classmates, you can be put through Kafkaesque trials and Maoist reeducation on campus, and the mark on your permanent record can prevent you from getting into a good professional school.”
Why it matters: “Piece by piece, woke activists are assembling a private version of China’s social credit system, which can cut off individuals who run afoul of ideological orthodoxy from acquiring educational credentials, practicing a trade, or engaging in political speech. While Trotskyist entryists spent decades trying to infiltrate and influence social democratic parties and trade unions, woke entryists in only a decade and a half have captured many of the leading communications, sales, and financial platforms in modern society, along with professional associations and universities. Leon Trotsky would be impressed.”
7. Who will save us from the economists’ reign of terror?
Why you should read it: The New Republic columnist Timothy Noah rails against the outsized influence of economic thinking on public policy and its intrusion into areas that demand a wider intellectual lens - or merely a different one.
Why was three decades’ deliberation necessary to impose such a commonsense safety precaution [of underride guards on large trucks]? Because [Jayne] Mansfield met her fate just as the economics profession was advancing, like an occupying army, into noneconomic agencies of the federal government. The result was a mindset—an ideology, really—that dominates public policymaking to this day. The Marxists (of whom I am not one) have an excellent term for this ideology: Economism. At a time of extreme political polarization, an Economicist bias (pronounced eh-co-nom-i-sist) is practically the only belief that Democrats and Republicans share… After the 2008 housing crash, Economism lost much of its luster in the academic world, and under President Joe Biden we may be seeing tentative signs (in, for example, this year’s Inflation Reduction Act) that congressional Democrats feel less beholden to Economicist dogma. But to make a clean break, Democrats need to understand how Economism conquered Washington, and how the reduction of noneconomic policy choices to mathematical models and formulas wreaked havoc on many efforts to address the country’s most urgent problems.”
“But Economism isn’t merely a governing tool; it’s become just about the only governing tool. For half a century, economists have had their finger in every conceivable pie. It was economists, led by Friedman and by Walter Oi of the University of Washington, who showed President Richard Nixon how he could fulfill his 1968 campaign promise to end the Vietnam draft, quieting student protests but a generation later rendering feasible a 20-year military stalemate in Afghanistan. It was economists, led by Alfred E. Kahn of Cornell, who persuaded President Jimmy Carter to deregulate the airline industry, reducing prices but also turning legroom into a commodity for which wealthier passengers pay extra. It was economists, like George Stigler of the University of Chicago, whose work led jurists Richard Posner of the 7th Circuit, Robert Bork of the D.C. Circuit, and Lewis Powell of the Supreme Court to eviscerate antitrust enforcement, enthroning the consumer at great cost to the laborer. ‘I really don’t know one plane from the other,’ Kahn cheerfully confessed. ‘To me they are all marginal costs with wings.’ He was chairman of the Civil Aeronautics Board at the time… The cure for Economism isn’t more economics, but less. Economics needs to back the hell off. It can remain a tool—I hope I’ve made clear that economics can be a very useful tool—but it can no longer remain the only tool, or even necessarily the primary one.”
Why it matters: “…Economism is out of control. Those Mansfield bars? In 2015, NHTSA proposed a regulation requiring that underride guards meet a higher standard of strength and energy absorption, because every year more than 200 people die, on average, the same way Jayne Mansfield did more than half a century ago. Still. The final rule came out this past July, but only after New York Democratic Senator Kirsten Gillibrand inserted into the infrastructure bill language telling NHTSA to get off the dime. It’s progress of a sort to wait seven years for a safety regulation instead of 28 years, and 1,400 deaths is fewer than 9,000. But when the new regulation was finally published, Joan Claybrook, who was NHTSA administrator in the 1970s, said it was wholly inadequate—‘an affront to the families of underride victims.’ Other safety advocates seemed to agree. Why wasn’t the Mansfield bar rule stronger? Because, the economists tell us, a human life is worth only so much.”
8. Why Democrats should pay attention Tim Ryan’s surprisingly competitive Ohio Senate run
Why you should read it: Journalist Alec MacGillis profiles Rep. Tim Ryan, the Democratic candidate for Ohio’s open Senate seat in this year’s mid-term election, for the New York Times.
“Mr. Ryan seems like an unlikely object of such caustic rhetoric. A 49-year-old former college-football quarterback, he is the paragon of affability, a genial Everyman whose introductory campaign video is so innocuous that it might easily be mistaken for an insurance commercial. His great passions, outside of politics, are yoga and mindfulness practice… He isn’t just preaching kindness and forgiveness. For years, he has warned his fellow Democrats that their embrace of free trade and globalization would cost them districts like the one he represents in the Mahoning River Valley — and lobbied them to prioritize domestic manufacturing, which, he argued, could repair some of the damage.”
"After years of being overlooked, Tim Ryan is pointing his party toward a path to recovery in the Midwest. On the campaign trail, he has embraced a unifying tone that stands out from the crassness and divisiveness that Mr. Trump and his imitators have wrought… And his core message — a demand for more aggressive government intervention to arrest regional decline — is not only resonating with voters but, crucially, breaking through with the Democratic leaders who presided over that decline for years. The Democrats have passed a burst of legislation that will pave the way for two new Intel chip plants in the Columbus exurbs, spur investment in new electric vehicle ventures in Mr. Ryan’s district, and benefit solar-panel factories around Toledo, giving him, at long last, concrete examples to cite of his party rebuilding the manufacturing base in which the region took such pride.”
Why it matters: “There were other models on the ballot this fall for how Democrats might seek to win in the Midwest… But Mr. Ryan’s bid may have the most riding on it, because it is based on substantive disagreements within the party about how to rebuild the middle class and the middle of the country. For years, too many leading Democrats stood by as the wrenching transformation of the economy devastated communities, while accruing benefits to a small set of highly prosperous cities, mostly on the coasts, that became the party’s gravitational center. It was so easy to disregard far-off desolation — or to take only passing note of it, counting the dollar stores as one happened to traverse areas of decline — until Mr. Trump’s victory brought it to the fore… The approach may well fall short this time in Ohio, because Mr. Ryan’s party has let so much terrain slip out of its hands. But even so, it showed what might have been, all along, and might yet be again, if a region can begin to recover, and the resentment can begin to recede.”
9. What #MeToo wrought
Why you should read it: In The Spectator, writer Phoebe Maltz-Bovy make the case that after five years the #MeToo movement hasn’t changed all that much when it comes to workplace sexual harassment - and provided a template for the wider phenomenon of cancel culture.
“…#MeToo did change plenty on a cultural level. What began as an office (well, movie-set) anti-harassment campaign morphed into a broader rethinking of sexual norms. The new progressive approach involves taking not just formal relationships (boss-employee, etc.) but power dynamics into account when deciding whether a pairing is truly consensual. Any couple where one person makes a lot more money, or is more professionally accomplished, or has more Instagram followers — whatever — now elicits a concerned hmm… Whole new categories of romantic partnership have become taboo, even when ostensibly between consenting adults: professors and former students, entertainers and fans. Age and status disparities started to be conflated with, in effect, sheer predation: even if both parties think they’re game, if there’s a difference in power, one must surely be prey.”
“But the main contribution of #MeToo had less to do with anything specific to gender or sex, and far more with how society addresses wrongdoing in general. #MeToo formalized a new cultural template for dealing with bad behavior: cancel culture. Cancellation — a nebulous, disputed category — says less about specific crimes or consequences and more about an aura of Bad that hovers, forever, around certain individuals. A sort of wait isn’t he the one we’re not supposed to like anymore? persists even if charges are dropped, even if there were no charges and the original accusation is forgotten… Without #MeToo, it would be impossible to make sense of the dynamics of the racial reckoning in summer 2020. Not the street protests, which are a fixture of social justice movements generally, but the endless cycles of accusation, apology and promises to do better in media and other white-collar professions. Much as #MeToo tried to solve sexism by identifying and shaming the sexists, the social justice movement that succeeded it sought to locate, and symbolically take down, the racists.”
Why it matters: “Filling the void regarding what, practically, should be done about male misbehavior is a complicated neo-Victorianism. A number of temperamentally, if not always politically, conservative thinkers have stepped in to suggest that caddishness is a feature, not a bug, of sexual liberation. Rather than inventing ever more complicated definitions of consent, they suggest the entire system of casual sex needs burning down… Early on #MeToo was criticized for infantilizing women by assuming their lack of agency, for curtailing their freedom to act as they chose. But at least it made women safer, right? If not, what, exactly, was the point?”
Odds and Ends
How dragons got their wings in Western mythology…
Why European climate change rules might force Irish peat farmers to give up their main source of heating - just ahead of a likely winter energy crunch…
How the U.S. Air Force and Norwegian military rescued a stranded CV-22 Osprey in the middle of a protected nature reserve…
Why Green Day’s “Good Riddance (Time of Your Life)” should be seen as the band’s definitive song…
How archaeologists are unearthing a Bronze Age city at Iklaina in Greece’s Peloponnese…
What I’m Listening To
My three favorite songs from Taylor Swift’s just-released album Midnights:
Image of the Month
